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Abstract 
Economic distortions created by the dairy farming support system in Iceland are 
examined in this paper. Specifically, the impact of the direct payments component 
of this system is  analyzed. The analysis lead to the conclusion that the form of 
direct payments that has been used is in many ways well-suited to improve dairy 
farmers' living standards without creating additional social costs in terms of 
resource misallocation. It follows that it would be socially wasteful, as well as 
economically detrimental to dairy farmers, to replace this system with an 
economically less efficient way of providing them with the same amount of 
financial support.  
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1 Introduction  
In Iceland, as in most developed countries, there is a long tradition of government 
interventions in the domestic agricultural market. These interventions take many forms 
including restricting trade across borders, the pricing of agricultural products and financial 
support to the farming industry. The history of state support for dairy farming in Iceland 
stretches back at least to the 1930s (Stefánsson, 1986; Stefánsson, 1998). Over time, both the 
form and extent of this support has been repeatedly altered, sometimes quite radically. In 
recent decades much of the support has consisted of a combination of a minimum price and 
various financial subsidies to farmers, as well as tariffs.  
Since 1992, a major component of state support for dairy farming has been in the form of 
direct payments to farmers for production up to a certain upper limit. These payments are in 
addition to what dairy processors pay to the farmers. Our analysis here is focused on the 
system in the period 1992-2016, as will be further detailed and explained below. Under this 
system, the government, after consulting with the association of dairy farmers and association 
of dairies, annually sets the total volume of milk that will receive direct payments during the 
following calendar year.2 Individual farmers hold rights to these direct payments expressed as 
shares of the stipulated total volume entitled to direct payments, and receive direct payments 
according to their production up to their individual share. Production in excess of their 
individual share is permitted but does not receive direct payments. It is readily seen that this 
system, referred to in Iceland as the direct payment quota system ("greiðslumarkskerfið"), is 
essentially an individual quota system for production subsidies.  
This paper is concerned with the economic implications of the direct payment quota 
system in dairy farming. Although, subsidies that do not alter (or distort) economic behaviour 
may not exist, it is intuitively obvious that different forms of supports may have differential 
impacts in this respect. The dairy support system in Iceland is based for the most part on four 
pillars: (i) tariffs to limit or prevent imports of dairy products, (ii) guaranteed minimum 
producer prices, (iii) the direct payment quota system, and iv) various other support 
payments. The primary question considered in this paper is whether the direct payment quota 
system causes economic inefficiency in dairy farming in addition to the inefficiency that tariffs 
and minimum prices may generate.3 A secondary question, also considered in the paper, is 
whether moving from the direct payment quota system to a system of direct payments for all 
production would increase or decrease the level of inefficiency that resulted from the dairy 
support system in place in 1992-2016.4  
The paper is organized as follows. The key elements of the current dairy farming support 
system are described in the next section. In section 3, the essential components of this system 
are modelled and its economic implications examined. The policy implications of the work are 
discussed in section 4. Finally, in section 5, the main results of the paper are discussed.  
                                                     
2   A fuller description of this framwork is provided in secton 2 below. 
3  We say additional, as it is well established that trade restrictions, such as tariffs and ban on imports, 
as well as guaranteed minimum producer prices generally cause inefficiencies. The question in this 
is paper whether the direct payments system adds to that inefficiency. 
4  Regulations on the dairy support system were changed for 2017 (Regulation no. 1150/2016) with the 
aim of moving away from the direct payment quota system to a system of direct payments for all 
production (per litre subsidy). 
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2 The dairy support system: Basic description  
Until 1980 there were no official restrictions on the volume of milk production. Farmers, 
however, were guaranteed a certain government set minimum price for the milk they 
supplied to dairies. This led to production in excess of domestic demand which was 
exported with the help of state provided export subsidies (Kristófersson et al., 2007).  
In 1980, in order to curtail the growth in export subsidies, a system to limit production 
(the so-called "búmarkskerfi") was adopted. According to this system, individual dairy 
farmers were to receive the full minimum price for production only up to a certain 
maximum volume which was set according to their average production 1976-8 
(Stefánsson, 1998). Thus, this system was essentially an individual farm quota system for 
price supports, with only production within the farm quota being entitled to the full 
minimum price. Importantly, however, export subsidies for excess production were 
retained. This system led to a certain reduction in dairy production but not sufficiently to 
allow the payment of the full minimum price for all production (Stefánsson, 1998; 
Kristófersson et al., 2007). In response to the continuing overproduction, the system was 
modified in 1985. The overall production quota (referred to as "fullvirðisréttur") was 
divided between 25 regions and individual farm quotas revised in accordance with their 
actual production in 1982-5. This further reduced overproduction (Kristófersson et al., 
2007; Ásmundsdóttir,2012). 
A major overhaul of the dairy support system took place in 1992 (Act no. 99/1993; 
Kristófersson et al., 2007).5 Most importantly, subsidies to dairies and export subsidies were 
abolished. In their place direct payments from the state to farmers for production up to a 
certain pre-decided volume or quota (referred to as "greiðslumark") were introduced. The 
minimum price system was retained. So, the direct payments were on top of the minimum 
price received by the farmers from the dairies. The individual farm quotas, designated as 
percentages of the total production volume entitled to direct payments 
("heildargreiðslumark"), were allocated in a way similar to what had applied previously. 
Importantly, these quotas were made explicitly transferable albeit with certain restrictions. As 
before, these quotas were not limits on production. However, for production in excess of the 
quota, farmers only received the price the dairies were willing to pay. 
                                                     
5  The parliament passed legislation to overhaul the agricultural support system in 1992. The Act on the 
Production, Pricing and Sale of Agricultural Products (Act No. 46/1985), which applies both to sheep 
farming and dairy production, was changed (Acts no. 5/1992 and no. 112/1992) and then re-written 
and re-issued as Act no. 99/1993. The Act lays down that a binding agreement on dairy production 
must be made with the Farmers Association. Within this framework, policies are determined by 
renewable multi-year agreements between the government and the Farmer’s Association, which 
provides the general framework for support and production control in covered sectors. One of these 
agreements covers the dairy sector, the Agreement on Dairy Production, and expired in 2016. That 
agreement, and previous ones since 1991, are the basis of our analysis here. A new agreement has 
since been negotiated and enacted for the period 2017-2026. The new agreement brought changes to 
the direct payments system with an aim to abolish the quota system and replace it with a system of 
production subsidies (see Act no. 102/2016 and the 2016 agreement on dairy production). Hence, our 
secondary question posed in the introduction. 
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2.1 The essentials of the system in 1992-2016 
In addition to import restrictions and tariffs, 6 the dairy support system consists of the 
following three main components:  
 
1. A minimum price per litre of milk supplied to and payable by dairies. This price is 
set by the Agricultural Pricing Committee ("Verðlagsnefnd búvara").  
2. Supplementary direct payments ("beingreiðslur") from the state to farmers for milk 
delivered to dairies up to a predetermined total volume ("heildargreiðslumark").  
The key elements of this system are:  
o The Government (Parliament) decides on the amount of total direct payments 
for each calendar year. In what follows, we refer to this amount as S.7  
o The Government (Ministry of Agriculture), having received proposals by the 
association of dairy processors and the association of dairy farmers 
(Landssamband kúabænda), decides on the total volume of milk production 
entitled to direct payments ("heildargreiðslumark") per calendar year. We refer 
to this volume as the total direct payment quota and denote it by Q.  
o The potential direct payment to farmers per litre of milk delivered to dairies 
and entitled to direct payments is thus defined as s=S/Q.  
o The actual payment received by individual farmers depends on their level of 
production according to a fairly complicated payment formula.8 
o The total direct payment quota, Q, is shared amongst individual dairy farms 
with farm i holding the fraction a(i).  
o Once the total direct payment quota has been set, the individual direct 
payment quotas are determined as ( ) ( ) .q i a i Q= ⋅ 9  
o The direct payment quota shares, a(i)s are transferable with some restrictions. 
3. Various other supports such as payments per head of cattle, supports for breeding 
programs (genetic improvements), land improvement supports, supports for 
construction and improvement of stables and other facilities.  
 
Of these categories of support, only the second and third represent outlays by the 
government; the first is paid for by consumers in the form of a higher price for milk 
                                                     
6  For a short summary on the import tariffs and other import restrictions, see the Institute of 
Economics Studies report on the dairy industry (Hagfræðistofnun 2015). 
7  Prior to the government decision, negotiations between the Ministry of Agriculture and the Farmers' 
Associations take place (see also footnote 5 above). The game-theoretic aspects of these negotiations 
are interesting but irrelevant for and outside the scope of this paper.  
8  According to the regulations for the 2016 calendar year (no. 1220/2015), the direct payment to any 
given dairy farmer is divided into three categories, A, B and C. Payment A amounting to 40% of the 
payment per litre (i.e. s) becomes fully payable if the farmer produces 80% or more of his individual 
quota during the year. For less production, the A payment is proportional to the level of production. 
Payment B amounting to 35% of s depends directly on the level of production. Payment C, 
amounting to 25% of s is only paid in full for the volume the farmer produces at least 1/12 of his 
annual quota during each of the last 7 months of the year. The direct payment schedule is explained 
and considered in further detail in the Appendix.  
9  But see also previous footnote. 
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products than would otherwise be the case. In 2016, the government expenditures on 
support categories 2 and 3 were 6.6 billion kr. of which direct payments amounted to 
about 5.5 billion kr. or 83% (Ríkisreikningur, 2016).  
It should be noted that the minimum price payable by dairies is sustained by tariffs, 
import restrictions and strict quality controls on the importation of dairy products 
including the main ones (fresh milk, cream and butter). Without these import barriers, it 
would not be possible for the dairy processors to pay the minimum price for the milk 
supplied to them by farmers. Thus, the import restrictions are an integral part of the 
overall dairy support system. Without it the minimum price regime would likely collapse.  
It is important to realize that the dairy support system in effect does not impose a 
restriction on the volume produced by individual farmers. They are allowed to produce as 
much as they want.10 However, they will not receive direct payments for production in excess 
of their direct payment quota and while the dairies have in practice often paid the minimum 
price for milk supplied in excess of the direct payment quota, they are not required to do so. 
2.2 Quantitative description of the 1992-2016 system  
Table 1 summarizes key quantitative information about the operation of the direct 
payments system from 2005 onward. The second column of the table shows the total 
volume of milk production entitled to direct payments, i.e. the direct payment quota, Q.11 
Apparently, the direct payment quota is supposed to reflect expected total domestic 
consumption of milk products and, therefore, is determined by previous consumption as 
well as estimated change in consumption (Act no. 99/1993, article 52). Hence the 
increasing trend over time.  
The third column in table 1 shows the total amount of direct payments, S, 
evaluated at the 2016 price level. Note that this amount (total direct payments) declined 
substantially in real terms since 2005 or by some 23%.  
The fourth column in table 1, obtained as the ratio of the third to the second 
columns, shows the direct payments per litre of production. As is readily seen, the direct 
payments per litre have fallen drastically in real terms since 2005 or by almost 2/5. 
 
                                                     
10  The regulations issued by the Ministry (based on Act 99/1993) obligate the dairy producers and 
processors to export all products in excess of the total volume of the support quota. But the same 
regulations also provide for exemptions from those obligations. See article 3 in Regulation no. 
1220/2015. 
11  Until the end of 2010 the direct payment quota was set for the so-called "price years" ("verðlagsár") 
which were defined from the 1st of September to the 31st of August. From 2011, this was switched to 
the calendar year. In table 1, for conformity over time, the total payment quota per calendar year 
before 2011 has been approximated by weighted average by months (Institute of Economic Studies, 
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The fifth column in table 1 shows the minimum price payable by dairies to farmers 
for a litre of first-rate milk produced within the individual direct payment quota. As 
already stated, this minimum price is determined each year by the Agricultural Pricing 
Committee ("Verðlagsnefnd búvara").12 As can be seen in table 1, the minimum price, 
measured in 2016 real terms, increased considerably until 2008 but has been relatively 
constant since then.  
A farmer’s total revenue per litre of milk produced is the sum of the direct payment per 
litre and the minimum price. This is shown in the last column in table 1. It shows that 
the total revenue (calculated price) per litre has declined since 2005 by almost 12%.13 
2.3 Direct payment quotas and milk production   
As pointed out above, the individual direct payment quota is not a production quota. It 
does not constrain the farmer to produce only the volume that the payment quota 
stipulates. Rather, the payment quota simply defines a right to a government subsidy per 
litre of production up to the quota limit (further details on the subsidy price per litre are 
in the Appenix).  In fact, every year dairy farmers have produced milk considerably in 
excess of the direct payment quota (see table 2).14 
                                                     
12  This minimum price is supposed to ensure that dairy farmers' income is similar to that of comparable 
professions. As such it incorporates information on production costs (Act No. 99/1993, Article 8) as 
well as the expected direct payments. 
13  The total amount of the direct payments has declined, in real terms (2016 price level), by 25%, and 
total government payments to the dairy sector has declined, in real terms, by 11% in this same period, 
2003-2016. 
14  Milk production has been in excess of the total payment quota volume every year since the late 1990s. 
Table 1. Total dairy support system: key information 
  
Direct payment 
quota 
(million litres) 
Total direct 
payments 
(billion ISK) 
Direct pay-
ments per litre 
(ISK/litre) 
Minimum ex 
farm price 
(ISK/litre) 
Total 
revenue 
(ISK/litre) 
2005 107.7 7.2 66.7 76.1 142.8 
2006              112.7 7.0 62.8 75.6 138.4 
2007 116.3 6.6 57.2 77.4 134.6 
2008 117.7 6.2 53.4 88.2    141.6 
2009 118.1 5.7 47.5 87.6 135.1 
2010 116.3 5.4 46.8 81.5 128.2 
2011 116.0 5.4 46.7 83.8 130.6 
2012 114.0 5.4 47.2 82.8 130.0 
2013 116.0 5.4 46.2 81.8 127.9 
2014 125.0 5.5 43.8 83.0 126.8 
2015 140.0 5.5 39.5 83.5 123.1 
2016 136.0 5.5 40.6 85.3 125.9 
Sources: Regulations on "greiðslumark mjólkur á lögbýlum og greiðslur til bænda", Hagfræðistofun (2015), Ministry of 
Industries and Innovation, Statistics Iceland and authors‘ calculations.  Notes: All monetary values at 2016 price level. This is 
calculated as the nominal price divided by the consumer price index without housing set at unity in 2016. 
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Milk production in excess of direct payment quota, referred to as excess milk 
("umframmjólk"), may be sold to dairies but it is not subject to the minimum price 
stipulated by the Agricultural Pricing Committee.15 The dairies are free to pay a different 
price for the excess milk and the farmer does not receive any direct payments for excess 
milk (but see Appendix further on this). The price that dairies have paid for excess milk 
has been highly dependent on the domestic demand for milk products relative to the 
production. In years of high demand relative to production, the dairies have proved 
willing to pay at least the minimum price. When domestic demand has been low relative 
to production and the dairies have been forced to produce low priced products such as 
milk powder for export, they have offered considerably lower price for the excess milk 
(Institute of Economic Studies, 2015). 16 
                                                     
15  This committee not only sets the minimum price (for various grades of milk) that dairies have to pay 
farmers for their milk. The dairy production sector is bound by price controls on all standard 
products, such as whole milk, skimmed milk, cream, plain butter, hard cheese, plain skyr, and milk 
powder. The committe therefore sets the maximum (ceiling) wholesale level prices for these products 
(it in effect attempts to calculate a proper margin that the dairies need to recover production costs 
on top of the minimum prices paid to milk farmers). Other non-standard dairy products, such as 
varieties of cheeses, buttermilk, yogurt, etc. are not subject to price controls. Also, there is freedom 
of pricing at the retail level. The Institute of Economic Studies (2014:46-47) report shows that 
wholesale prices for those dairy products subject to price ceilings have declined in real terms (price 
level 2013) by 1%-18% in 2003-2013; cream price declined most and skimmed-milk powder the least. 
They also show that retail prices for these products have increased less than the general consumer 
price index in the same period. This suggests that slowly decreasing government support to the dairy 
industry is increasing consumer surplus. 
16  This market price for excess milk was about 50-70% of the minimum price in 2008-2013, but in 2013-
2016 it increased to 100%. It was approximately 75% of the minimum price from July 2016. For 
information on price of unprocessed milk, see Audhumla.is. 
Table 2. Production of excess milk 
 
(1) 
Direct payment quota 
(million litres) 
(2) 
Total production 
(million litres) 
(3) 
Excess milk 
(million litres) 
 (4) 
 (3)/(1) 
 
2005 107.7 109.4 1.8 1.7% 
2006 112.7 117.1 6.1 5.5% 
2007 116.3 124.8 8.8 7.6% 
2008 117.7 126.1 9.1 7.7% 
2009 118.1 125.6 6.6 5.5% 
2010 116.3 123.2 7.2 6.2% 
2011 116.0 124.8 8.8 7.6% 
2012 114.0 125.2 10.7 9.3% 
2013 116.0 122.9 6.9 6.0% 
2014 125.0 133.6 8.6 6.9% 
2015 140.0 146.1 6.1 4.3% 
2016 136.0 150.4 14.4 10.6% 
Sources: Regulations on "greiðslumark mjólkur á lögbýlum og greiðslur til bænda", Auðhumla, SAM ("Samband afurðastöðva 
í mjólkuriðnaði") yearly reports.  
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Table 2 shows the volume and percentage of excess milk produced by dairy farmers from 
2005. The table shows that in spite of the marginal revenue for excess milk being substantially 
lower than marginal revenue for milk produced within the direct payment quota, farmers have 
elected to produce a significant amount of excess milk every year. On average since 2005, the 
volume of excess milk produced has been 6.6% of the direct payment quotas. Most of the years, 
the excess milk production has been above 5%.17 In only one year, 2005, has it been below 2%.18   
Farmers, of course, produce excess milk because they deem it profitable. In the short run, 
the marginal cost of producing milk may be low because the necessary investment in cows 
and facilities is already there. However, a persistent and substantial production of excess milk 
is strong evidence that at least some farmers and therefore the industry as a whole can produce 
milk at a (marginal) cost below the minimum price.  
2.4 Transferability of direct payment quotas   
The direct payment quotas held by individual farmers are transferable (Act No. 99/1993).19 
During the early years of the direct payments system (in the 1990s), these transfers were for 
the most part unrestricted. However, subsequently, it was apparently felt necessary to impose 
restrictions on how these trades could proceed. According to regulations in 2010-2016, 
transfers of direct payment quotas took place under the auspices of MAST (the Icelandic Food 
and Veterinary Authority). MAST invited written bids and offers that were opened on specific 
market days (three times a year). On the basis of the bids and offers MAST worked out supply 
and demand schedules and calculated the so-called equilibrium price ("jafnvægisverð"). All 
lower bids and higher offers were then rejected and the remaining bids and offers became 
binding contracts.  
From 2011 the annual volume of trades was generally between one and two million litres 
or above 1% of the total volume of outstanding direct payment quotas (Figure 1). This suggests 
considerable rearrangement of the milk production between farms under the direct payment 
system, a finding consistent with the reduction in the number of active dairy farms (see section 
2.5 below).20 
                                                     
17  In the period 2001-2012 about 10%-15% of the volume of milk were exported (in the form of dairy 
products), but then fell substanstially in 2013-2016, averaging only about 1% in this period (see SAM, 
yearly report for 2016, p. 25). 
18  The reasons for this low proportion of excess milk in 2005 is at least partly explained by two factors: 
First, there was a large increase in the direct payment quota from 106 million litres in 2004/2005 to 
111 million litres in 2005/2006, an increase of 4.7%. This, according to the new Agreement on Dairly 
Production in 2004, also meant a drop in direct payments per litre. Second, unfavorable weather in 
the spring and summer of 2005 made dairy farming unusually difficult that year (see Árskýrsla SAM 
2005). 
19  With the changes in regulations for 2017 (Regulation no. 1150/2016) the quotas are no longer freely 
transferable. Farmers wanting to sell now only have the option of „selling“ to the government at a 
pre-announced government price (well below the market price in previous auctions in 2016) and 
farmers wanting to buy can apply/bid for quota (which will be met according to somewhat 
complicated allocation rules that stipulate eligibility). 
20  In fact trade in dairly quotas has on average been about 3% of the production volume each year since 
1992 (see Hagtölur Landbúnaðarins 2010, at bondi.is, MAST at mast.is, Rannís 2001 and Stöðumat og 
stefnumótun í mjólkurframleiðslu, skýrsla til landbúnaðarráðherra, febrúar 2004, at 
atvinnuvegaraduneyti.is). In the report Stöðumat og stefnumótun í mjólkurframleiðslu (2004) trades in 
quotas in the period 1998-2003 are analyzed specifically. Trades in quotas (where quotas were 
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Figure 1 summarizes key information about the market for direct payment quotas 
between 2010 and 2016. The figure shows considerable market activity until 2014. The total 
amount of supply (offers to sell) and demand (bids to buy) is very considerable with the 
volume of actual trades naturally being substantially lower.  
As shown in figure 1, there was a severe drop in market activity and trades between 2014 
and 2015. The reasons for this trough, while interesting, are outside the scope of this study. 
However, there are indications that uncertainty about the future of the direct payments system 
in connection with the general review of the overall dairly farming support system which got 
underway in 2014 may have played a major role in this. This hypothesis is lent certain 
quantitative support by the fact that the supply (offers to sell) of direct payment quotas during 
the first market period in 2014 was very high while the demand (bids to buy) was almost non-
existent. 21  
The direct payment quota market recovered in 2015 and especially 2016, apparently partly 
because of less uncertainty about the future of the system.22 In addition, it should be noted that 
market activity in the September and November 2016 may have been distorted upward by the 
                                                     
transferred between farms) were on average 4.7% of total volume of production each year and 
additionally another 4% were transferred on average each year through ownership changes of farms. 
Of these ownership changes, about a third were between unrelated parties while over 60% were 
based on next generation assuming ownership or incorporating the farm business. Based on this 
information, in addition to that mentioned above, we could infer that no less than 4% of quotas have 
changed ownership on average each year in 1992-2016. But, of course, some of this quota has been 
traded more than once in the period, so we should not assume that all or nearly all the quota has 
changed hands, although the number of dairy farms has decreased in this period from 1456 to 596, 
or by almost 3/5. 
21  The large increase in the volume of quota in 2013-2015, some 20% increase, may also have affected 
the lower trade in quotas, as well as the decision by dairies to pay full minimum price for excess milk 
from October 2013. 
22 Expectations formed on news from the discussions between the farmers association and the 
government that the quota system would be retained in some form at least to 2020. 
 
Figure 1. Direct payment quota markets and trades   
Source: MAST. 
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previous announcement of a provisional halt to direct payment quota trading from 2017 
onward.  
From 2010 to 2014, the equilibrium price for direct payment quotas was fairly constant at 
close to 300 kr./litre (at current price levels). However, it dropped considerably in 2014 and 
was around 200 to 250 kr./litre in 2015 and 2016. It may be noted that these direct payment 
quota prices (of five to seven times the direct payments) suggest either inordinately high 
discount rates of between 14 and 20% or the expectation that the system of direct payments 
will end in the near future (next 4 to 8 years) or both.  
2.5 Increased productivity    
There is considerable evidence of increased productivity in dairy production under the direct 
payments system at least since 2005.23 First, the number of farms has fallen and the average 
production per farm has increased substantially (see figure 2).  
This suggests that technically available returns to scale in dairy production at the farm 
level are being exploited to a greater extent than before. Second, the total real price per unit of 
milk production received by the farmers (see table 1 and figure 3) has declined considerably 
since 2005 while at the same time, dairy farmers' net income has, if anything, improved. This 
also suggests improvement in productivity.  
 
 
This suggests that technically available returns to scale in dairy production at the farm 
level are being exploited to a greater extent than before. Second, the total real price per unit of 
milk production received by the farmers (see table 1 and figure 3) has declined considerably 
since 2005 while at the same time, dairy farmers' net income has, if anything, improved. This 
also suggests improvement in productivity.  
                                                     
23  Actually, available production statistics (Auðhumla og ársskýrslur SAM) indicate a considerable 
growth in production per farm since 1978. This growth, however, became much more rapid from 
1993 onwards as the system of direct payment was adopted.  
Figure 2. The number of dairy farms and their average production  
Sources: Regulations on "greiðslumark mjólkur á lögbýlum og greiðslur til bænda", Auðhumla, SAM ("Samband afurðastöðvar 
í mjólkuriðnaði") yearly reports. 
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As explained above, the total price received by dairy farmers for their production consists 
of the minimum price paid to them by the dairies and the direct payments received from the 
state. The evolution of these prices in real terms (2016 price level), is illustrated in figure 3. As 
is evident from the figure, the total price has declined considerably or by 12% since 2005. Since, 
apparently, dairy farmers' net income has not declined during this period, this decline in the 
real price is indicative of at least the commensurate annual growth in total factor productivity 
of dairy farming since 2005.  
Interestingly, the fall in the real price received by dairy farmers is explained solely by the 
fall in the real value of the direct payments per litre of production. These payments have fallen 
by almost 2/5 since 2005 (for details see table 1), while the real value of the minimum price has 
actually increased slightly.  
3 Analysis   
In this section we attempt to explain the impact of two of the main strands of the milk 
production support system, namely the minimum price and the direct payments, on the level 
of milk production and economic efficiency. In accordance with standard economic practice, 
we assume that all prices, except the price of unprocessed milk, are true, i.e. accurately 
measure marginal social benefits and costs.  
We further take it for granted that there exists a domestic demand function for 
unprocessed milk with the usual properties (positive for some positive price, continuous, and 
downward sloping). We write the inverse of this function as:  
 
 
 , ,  < 0,  (1) 
 
Figure 3. Real price per litre of production received by dairy farmers  
Sources: Regulations on "greiðslumark mjólkur á lögbýlum og greiðslur til bænda", Auðhumla, SAM ("Samband 
afurðastöðvar í mjólkuriðnaði") yearly reports.  
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where q is the quantity of unprocessed milk. The vector z represents other variables that may 
affect the demand and Dq denotes the first derivative of the demand function (where it exits) 
with respect to the quantity of milk. Needless to say, this demand function is derived from the 
final demand for milk products. In this paper, however, the downstream stages of the value 
chain for milk products are not of concern.24  
Similarly, we take it that there exists an import supply function for unprocessed milk. For 
our purposes it is most convenient to define this supply as the same quality unprocessed milk 
delivered at the same locations and in the same containers as domestic milk. Therefore, 
although this supply price, pw, may be taken to be closely related to the world supply price of 
unprocessed milk, it would generally be somewhat higher. We write this supply price as:  
 
  = .  (2) 
 
Relative to the possible size of the Icelandic demand, it is safe to assume that the slope of 
this function is zero, i.e. the import supply is infinitely elastic implying a constant supply price 
pw. Importantly, this import price represents the price at which Icelandic society can obtain 
unprocessed milk from abroad. It thus reflects the true (or shadow) price of unprocessed milk 
in Iceland. 
The domestic supply of unprocessed milk comes from several hundred dairy farmers. Let 
the number of these farmers be I. Their individual production costs may presumably be 
represented by the increasing cost functions: 
 
 , ; ,  = 1,2, … ,  (3) 
 
where q(i) is the supply of farmer i, and x a vector of other variables affecting production costs 
including technology, farm attributes and so on. In what follows, for notational simplicity, 
reference to the vector x will generally be suppressed. For convenience we assume that these 
cost functions are twice continuously differentiable.  
Assuming, quite reasonably, that all of these dairy farmers are price takers, it is well-
known that their individual supply functions are the upward sloping part of their marginal 
cost functions (see e.g. Varian 1984).25 In other words: 
 
( ) ( ( ); )q ip C q i i= ,  = 1,2, … ,  (4) 
 
where the first derivative of the cost function, Cq(i), denotes the marginal costs.  
                                                     
24  In fact the demand curve (function) does not play a role or affect our analysis below. It is only to 
illustrate the traditionl approach to explaining the welfare losses from restrictions on trade and price 
formation that we use it here in this section of the paper. In section 3,1 and after, the minimum price 
+ support price are the relevant demand. But the supply curve (function) has a role and affects the 
analysis. 
25
  Production ranges over which the cost function is nonconvex (e.g. increasing returns to scale) are 
irrelevant here because price takers never find it optimal to produce there (see e.g. Varian 1984). 
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The aggregate (total) domestic supply of unprocessed milk is simply the horizontal sum 
of the (upward sloping part) of the individual marginal cost functions (Hicks 1946, see also 
Varian 1984):  
 
1
( )
1 1
( ) ( ; ) ( , )
I I
q i
i i
q q i C p i F p I−
= =
= = ≡∑ ∑ . 
 (5) 
 
where q denotes the total supply and the functions 1( ) ( ; )q iC p i− are the inverse functions of the 
upward sloping parts of the individuao marginal cost functions. Note that the aggregate 
supply function F(.,.) depends, among other things, on the number of farms producing, which 
we have referred to as I.  
Inverting the last function in (5) provides the domestic supply function as: 
 
  = , ,   > 0.  (6) 
 
This must be positively sloping because the individual marginal cost functions are.26 
It seems helpful to illustrate the system defined by equations (1), (2) and (4) by the usual 
quantity-price diagram for the milk market. This is done in figure 4. In this figure, the domestic 
demand is labelled D(q), domestic supply S(q) and the import supply function by the import 
price, pw.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
26  It is useful to note, however, that because of the horizontal summation the aggregate supply function 
is generally flatter and usually much flatter than the individual supply functions.  
 
Figure 4. The domestic milk market: basic supply and demand  
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Now, there are indications that a part of the domestic milk production can be supplied at 
cost at or below the import price, pw.27 Consequently the domestic supply curve is drawn 
accordingly. It should be mentioned, however, that, for the analysis of this paper, it is of no 
consequence whether domestic industry can actually supply a positive quantity at or below 
the import price.  
As the functions in figure 4 are drawn, under free trade, market equilibrium would be at 
the import price, pw, and quantity q** of which the domestic supply would be q*. Total social 
benefits of this market equilibrium would be approximately the consumer surplus measured 
by the integral underneath the demand function,   − ,
∗∗

 plus the producer surplus 
indicated by the area A in the diagram (Varian 1984).28 Note that if the domestic supply price 
always exceeds the world import price, the socially optimal domestic production, q*, would 
be zero and therefore also the producer surplus A.  
At this point it is crucial to realize that any domestic production of milk in excess of q* is 
economically inefficient. The reason is that the cost of producing more than q* is higher than 
the price for which the product is available from abroad. This means that the domestic 
economic resources used to produce above q* would be better used in other activities. 
Moreover, the degree of inefficiency increases with the level of production beyond q*. We state 
this formally as result 1 
 
Result 1  
Any domestic production above q* is economically inefficient. The degree of inefficiency 
increases with the distance from q*.  
For later use it is convenient to define the social loss of producing milk in excess of q*. 
From a social perspective, the producer surplus of any production, q, is  
 
0
( ) ( )q wB q p S q dq= −∫ % %  
 
 
(7) 
This benefit function has a maximum at the socially optimal production level q*. At q* the 
producer surplus is B(q*) which equals the area A in figure 4. Thus the social loss of producing 
q is simply:  
 
 ,  ∗ =  ∗ − .  (8) 
 
It is easy to see that this social loss function has a minimum of zero at q=q*, is positive for any 
other levels of production and at least weakly convex. An example of its shape is illustrated in 
figure 5.  
                                                     
27  For instance some Icelandic dairy farms employing the state-of-the–art technology (robotic milking 
in a free-stall cow houses) and, producing close to million litres per year, are close to the efficient 
European diary farm size. Since farming land is inexpensive in Iceland, there seems no reason to 
believe that production costs in these farms are significantly higher than abroad.  
28  For a useful discussion about the accuracy of the consumer surplus measures, see Willig (1976).  
       Anna G. Ragnarsdóttir, Birgir Þór Runólfsson and Ragnar Arnason: The Dairy Farming Support System | 
15 
 
To induce domestic producers to produce above q* it is necessary to offer them a price 
above the import price, pw. This will lead to a social loss in production approximately 
measured by the social loss function (8). If, in addition, consumers are asked to pay the higher 
price, there will be a loss in consumer surplus as well. As an example, imagine in figure 4 that 
import of unprocessed milk is not allowed. In that case, all milk would be domestically 
produced and the market equilibrium would occur at (q°°, p°°). At this point there would be a 
total social loss amounting to the area C+D. The total social loss would not be equally 
distributed. Producers of milk who enjoy the higher price, p°°, would gain B while the 
demanders of unprocessed milk, who have to pay the higher price, p°°, would lose B+C+D.29 
3.1 The milk production support system     
As described in section 2, there is an extensive support system for primary milk production in 
Iceland. Most importantly, there are substantial barriers (import restrictions, tariffs and quality 
controls) on the import of unprocessed milk and several final milk products. In addition to 
this, domestic producers are supported primarily in three ways:  
 
1. Minimum price for unprocessed milk supplied to dairies.  
2. Direct payments from the state for production up to a certain volume 
("heildargreiðslumark"). 
3. Various other supports. 
 
Here we only consider the first two. The third consists of a number of production and 
investment supports (see section 2.1) which together amount to a small fraction of the other 
                                                     
29  Although the restriction of international trade in milk and related products is not the topic of analysis 
here, it may be of interest to the reader that in Hagfræðistofnun (2015) the production inefficiency 
resulting from trade restriction in Iceland is estimated to be of the size of 0.5-3.0 billion kr. pr. year.  
 
Figure 5. The social loss function: an example  
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two.30 
The minimum price is easily modelled as simply pmin which to be effective must be higher 
than the import price, pw. 
The direct payment from the state to holders of direct payment quotas is a bit more 
involved. The direct payment per litre of unprocessed milk subject to direct payments may be 
defined as: 31 
 
  =

!
  (9) 
 
Where S is the total amount allocated to direct payments and Q is the direct payment 
quota, i.e. the total volume of milk entitled to direct payments. As explained in section 2, the 
total direct payment is determined annually by the state budget. The direct payment quota, 
however, is determined subsequently by regulations issued by the Ministry of Agriculture, as 
mentioned above.  
Let us now try to incorporate these two main components of the dairy support system 
into the basic unprocessed milk market situation illustrated in figure 4. This is attempted in 
figure 6.  
Under the dairy support system, the price per litre of production received by the dairy 
farmers (their effective demand function) is the minimum price plus the direct payments from 
the state.  
The minimum price, pmin, is drawn as a horizontal line in figure 6. Dairy processors may 
of course offer a higher price than pmin or a lower minum price for quantity above the direct 
payment quota, indicated by Q' in figure 6. If so, the minimum price will not be a horizontal 
line. This, however, as is easy to verify, will not materially affect the ensuing analysis. 
The direct payments depend on the total funds allocated to direct payments, S, and the 
total direct payment quota, Q, as defined in equation (9). These direct payments (added to the 
minimum price) are drawn as the dashed curve in figure 6. The curve is dashed because it 
illustrates the total price to holders of direct payment quotas for various levels of total direct 
payment quota, Q. Only when Q has been selected will the amount of direct payments per litre 
of milk be determined.  
Let us now assume that the total direct payment quota has been set at Q' in figure 6 
resulting in direct payments per litre of s=S/Q'. In that case, dairy farmers will receive a price 
per litre of milk amounting to s+pmin for production up to volume Q'. For production above Q', 
however, dairy farmers only receive the minimum price, pmin. Thus, in effect, dairy farmers are 
faced with a one-step demand function indicated by the bold price lines in figure 6. The price 
is constant at s+pmin up to production volume Q'. At Q' there is a discontinuous fall in the price 
to pmin.32  
                                                     
30  In 2016, these other supports amounted to only about 17% of the total state supports (Ríkisreikningur 
2016). The state supports, however, do not include the minimum price supports which consumers 
pay. 
31  To actually receive the full direct payments per litre produced, farmers have to meet certain other 
payment conditions (see the Appendix).  
32  Due to the direct payment conditions (see the Appendix) the actual direct payments for production 
below Q' may possibly deviate from s. This, however, does not materially affect the anlysis; only the 
shape of the s+pmin schedule below Q' is affected. Moreover, this part of the price schedule is not 
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As the direct payment quota is set in the figure 6, i.e. at Q', dairy farmers find it profitable 
to produce in excess of this quota, more precisely at q'. This is, as explained in section 2.3 
above, in accordance with what has actually been the case under the direct payment system, 
as mentioned above.  
Now, the production level q' is higher than the socially optimal production q*. Therefore, 
as established by the social loss function, L(q,q*), q' represents excessive production. More 
precisely, at q', there is a loss in social surplus approximately equal to the shaded area B in 
figure 6.  
From the perspective of this paper, however, the crucial point is that the inefficiency of 
producing at q' is entirely caused by the minimum price. The direct payments have nothing to 
do with it. It is easily seen from the diagram in figure 6 that dairy farmers would produce 
exactly the same volume of milk, i.e. q', even if there were no direct payments. In other words, 
the direct payments are in this case pure transfers. They do not affect the quantity of milk 
produced. All the production inefficiency of the dairy support system is solely generated by 
the minimum price  
This finding, however, does not apply generally. It is entirely dependent upon the direct 
payment quota, Q, not being set too high. Thus, it is easy to see from figure 6 that if the direct 
payment quota is increased from Q' (for a fixed amount of direct payments, S), the level of 
production will ultimately start to rise. More precisely, this will happen when the direct 
payment quota, Q, exceeds q'.  
                                                     
empirically relevant as the industry has consistently produced in excess of Q' (see section 2.3). 
Moreover, as will be explained below a sensible operation of the direct payments system requires 
that to be the case.  
 
Figure 6. The domestic milk market: supports included  
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Now, q' is the milk production dairy farmers would choose as a result of the minimum 
price but without any direct payments. This suggests the following result:  
 
Result 2  
The system of direct payments to dairy farmers will not lead to added production inefficiency 
compared to the system of minimum price provided the direct payment quota, Q, is not set 
above the level the farmers would select with only the minimum price and no direct payments.  
 
So, it appears that if the authorities managing the dairy support system avoid setting the 
direct payment quota above the level, farmers would otherwise select, the system of direct 
payments will not generate production inefficiency in addition to that already created by the 
minimum price.  
3.2 The relationship between the direct payment quota and production inefficiency     
The above has established that whether the system of direct payments leads to increased milk 
production and, therefore, added production inefficiency depends on the size of the direct 
payment quota, Q. It therefore appears useful to investigate the relationship between the direct 
payment quota and the level of production further. To this we now turn: 
 
Let us assume that the amount of direct payments, S, has already been decided. Let q° 
denote the profit maximizing production by dairy farmers. Then, the decision on the direct 
payment quota can lead to three distinct situations or phases:  
 
I. Q<q°, 
II. Q=q°, 
III. Q>q°.  
 
It is important to realize that phase II applies to not merely one value of Q but to a range 
defined by the interval [Qlower,Qupper]. To see that this interval is of positive length it is sufficient 
to imagine Q' in figure 6 increasing to q' (which equals Qlower) and from there to q'' (which 
equals Qupper ).  
 
Phase I. Q<q° 
In this phase, the effective demand price to producers is pmin. So the farmers' profit maximizing 
production level is simply determined by S(q°)=pmin. So, the profit maximizing production 
level, q°, is independent of Q as asserted in result 2.  
 
As already stated, this phase ends when the direct payment quota has reached q° defined 
above as Qlower. It may be helpful to recall that in figure 6, q'=Qlower≡ q°. 
 
Phase II. Q=q° 
In this phase, the profit maximizing production level is simply q°=Q. So the production level, 
and, therefore, the production inefficiency increases proportionately with the total direct 
payment quota, Q, reaching a maximum at Qupper defined by S(q°)=pmin+S/Qupper. 
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Phase III. Q>q° 
In this phase, the direct payment quota exceeds the actual milk production. The marginal 
revenues to milk producers, therefore, are given by 
minp S Q+ , where S/Q, as before, is the 
payment per litre.33 The quantity produced, therefore, is defined by ( )
minS q p S Q° = + . From 
this it is easy to see that the farmers' profit maximizing production level, q° falls with the level 
of the direct payment quota, Q.34 Moreover, while starting at the maximum defined by 
S(q°)=pmin+S/Qupper, it converges asymptotically to S(q°)=pmin as the direct payment quota goes to 
infinity. 
The overall relationship between the total direct payment quota and the actual production 
is summarized in figure 7. As illustrated in the figure, for any level of direct supports, S, 
provided the total direct payment quota, Q, is set below Qlower, the direct payments have no 
effect on the volume of milk production. The production remains as if there were no direct 
payments.  
 However, when the direct payment quota exceeds, Qlower, phase II is entered and milk 
production starts to increase proportionately with the direct payment quota reaching a 
maximum at Qupper defined by 1( )upper min upperQ S p S Q−= + .35 Of course, with the direct 
payment quotas at Qupper, the production distortion of the support system is maximized with 
degree of social loss equalling L(Qupper,q*)=B(q*)–B(Qupper).  
 
 
 
                                                     
33  This assumes for simplicity that the payment conditions (see appendix A) are met so the direct 
payment price remains s=S/Q 
34  To see this note that the derivative "
°
"$
= −
%
$&
∙
(
%)
< 0.   
35  Notice that 1S −  is the inverse of the supply function. 
Figure 7. The impact of direct payment quota on milk production 
(S-1(.) on the vertical axis represents the inverse of the supply function). The domestic milk market: Supports included  
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Increasing the direct payment quota further leads to less production because the direct 
payments per litre fall with direct payment quota according to s=S/Q leading to less and less 
production ultimately converging to Qlower when Q approaches infinity and the direct payment 
per litre, s, converges to zero.  
Thus, somewhat curiously, the system of direct payments to dairy farmer has no 
distortionary impact on milk production when the direct payment quota is less than Qlower or, 
alternatively, infinitely high.  
 
3.3 Non-distortion of the direct payment system: The general result      
According to Result 2, the system of direct payments does not increase the production of milk 
provided the direct payment quota, Q, is not set above the production level the farmers would 
choose with only the minimum price support and no direct payments. Clearly, the minimum 
price system does not play any particular role in this context. What is of importance is the 
production level without the direct payments, irrespective of how this is brought about. This 
suggests the following generalization of Result 2.  
 
Result 3 
The system of direct payments to dairy farmers will not lead to added production inefficiency 
provided the direct payment quota, Q, is not set above what the farmers would otherwise 
produce.  
 
It is interesting to note that this result does not depend on the amount of direct payments, 
S. This can be as high or low as the authorities want. The authorities only have to be careful 
not to set the direct payment quota too high. Thus, the system of direct payments offers an 
effective way to bring social supports to farmers (and other producers) without affecting their 
production.  
In the dairy farming support system discussed in this paper, there are two potential 
distortions; the minimum price and the direct payments. Both encourage production. 
However, they interact in an interesting way. First the minimum price encourages production 
to a level above the socially optimal one, namely q' compared to q* in figure 6. Second the direct 
payments encourage production but only up to the level of the direct payment quota. Beyond 
the direct payment quota, there are no direct payments and therefore no encouragement to 
produce more. Thus, if the direct payment quota is set below what the farmers would produce 
anyway, the direct payments will have no impact on the level of production. Thus, in a sense, 
the minimum price, which induces the farmers to produce up to a certain level (q' in figure 6) 
nullifies the potentially distortionary impact of the direct payments, provided the direct 
payment quota is not set too high.  
It should be mentioned that after having derived Results 2 and 3 we discovered that a 
similar result had been claimed by Alston and James in 2002.36  
 
 
                                                     
36  According to Alston and James (2002, p. 1699): ”If a quota set equal to the competitive quantity were 
combined with a subsidy, transfers from taxpayers to producers could be made without any 
distortions in production or consumption because the quota would prevent supply response to the 
subsidy.” 
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4 Policy implications 
The analysis in section 3 shows that the dairy farming support system creates distortions that 
result in production inefficiency. Too much milk is produced. However, the different 
components of the support system; (i) tariffs, (ii) the minimum price, (iii) the direct payments 
and (iv) various other supports, are not equally detrimental in this respect. In particular, the 
system of direct payments does not add to the production inefficiency resulting from the 
minimum price, provided the total direct payment quota is not set too high. Interestingly, in 
the past, the direct payment quota has not been set too high. Every year since the late 1990s, 
the actual production of milk has been above and usually substantially above the direct 
payment quota. Thus, as it has been implemented, the system of direct payments has 
essentially been pure transfers from the state to dairy farmers with little or no distortionary 
impact.  
There is another important advantage with the system of direct payments compared to 
many other types of supports. The rights embodied in the individual direct payments quotas 
and their transferability creates an additional, and possibly quite powerful, incentive for less 
efficient operators to sell and more efficient operators to purchase the rights and thus speed 
up the evolution toward increased efficiency in the dairy production industry.  
This suggests that from the perspective of efficiency, the barriers to direct payment quota 
trading that have been erected within the current direct payments system should be removed. 
Most importantly; (i) quota trades should be allowed at any time, (ii) trades of temporary 
quotas as well as permanent quota transfers should be allowed and (iii) quotas should be 
perfectly divisible so that any part of the quota may be transferred.  
Since they are clearly distortionary, the other components of the dairy support system, i.e. 
the minimum price and the various other supports should be reduced in favour of the direct 
payments system. What this means is that the financial support to dairy farmers contained in 
these other supports should be transferred to the system of direct payments. In that case, the 
authorities managing the support system have to be careful not to set the direct payment quota 
too high. In particular, they should be aware that as the minimum price is reduced, the direct 
payment quota may have to be reduced accordingly.  
As a part of the official review of the dairy support system, it has been suggested that the 
direct payment system in its current form is somehow detrimental and should be modified. 
One proposal was to retain direct payments but abolish the direct payments quota, thus 
spreading the direct payments equally over all the entire milk production.  
The findings of this paper show that this would be extremely ill-advised. Instead of the 
direct payments system having no impact on the level of production, this would lead to 
increased production and, therefore, added economic inefficiency of milk production. The 
result is in effect an example of the problem of the commons; a race for subsidies. 
That this is the case can be easily verified with the help of figure 6. If the direct payment 
quota is abolished, the demand price facing farmers would be pmin+S/q illustrated by the dashed 
curve in figure 6. Obviously, with this demand, price farmers would choose to produce at q'' 
in figure 6. This is higher than what they would otherwise select, which is q'. Thus, excess 
production is increased with additional social loss as illustrated in figure 5. Perhaps more 
strikingly, the production at q'' is really a production at Qupper in figure 7, which maximizes the 
economic inefficiency that can be generated with the direct payments system for any given 
payment, S.  
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5 Discussion  
The system of direct payments provides monetary support to dairy farmers. Moreover this 
support is directly related to their level of production up to a certain upper bound. Thus, it is 
clearly a production subsidy. A standard result in economic theory is that production 
subsidies generally lead to increased production. However, according to the analysis of this 
paer, this is not the case for the system of direct payments over a wide range of direct payment 
quotas.  
What is happening here is that the dairy support system contains two distortionary 
incentives; the minimum price and the direct payments. Both encourage production. 
However, they interact in an interesting way. First the minimum price encourages production 
to a level above the socially optimal one. Second the direct payments encourage production 
but only up to the level of the direct payment quota. Beyond the direct payment quota, there 
are no direct payments and therefore no encouragement to produce more. Thus, if the direct 
payment quota is set below what the farmers would choose to produce anyway, the direct 
payments will have no impact on the level of production. Thus, in a sense, the minimum price, 
which induces the farmers to produce up to a certain level nullifies the potentially 
distortionary impact of the direct payments, provided the direct payment quota is not set 
above that level. 
This may be taken to suggest that if the minimum price were abolished but the system of 
direct payments retained, the latter would lead to excessive production compared to the what 
is socially optimal. This interpretation, however, would be too simplistic.  
The system of direct payments only distorts production if the direct payment quota is set 
above the level that farmers would choose without it. If the direct payment quota is set below 
that level, the system of direct payments will not distort production. Thus, with no minimum 
price, a system of direct payments will not generate excess production if the total payment 
quota, Q, is not set above the socially optimal production level (q* in figure 6 and figure 4).  
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Appendix  
The arrangement of the direct payments  
 
Under the direct payment system, the Ministry of Agriculture (now Ministry of Fisheries and 
Agriculture) each year issues regulations stipulating the total amount of direct payments, S, 
as well as the corresponding total volume of direct payment quota, Q, for the following year.37 
This leads to the direct payments per litre of s=S/Q. However, the Ministry has over the years 
imposed various conditions on how the direct payments can actually be paid. These conditions 
may in principle modify the direct payments, s, actually received by farmers although they 
don't seem to have done so in the past.  
 As an example of how this works; Regulation no. 1220/2015 stipulated the total direct 
payments to be 5.5 billion kr. in 2016 for a volume of 136 million litres of milk, which results 
in a calculated average direct payment price of 40.6 kr. pr. litre.38 The actual payments, which 
are made monthly, were however divided into three categories apparently to provide 
incentives for dairy farmers to produce the full amount of their quota (or as close to that mark 
as possible) and to do so evenly throughout the year. The payments (in 2016) were divided in 
the following categories: 
• Category A: 40% of the total direct payments are paid regardless of the quantity 
produced by the producer in question, provided his production reaches at least 80% of 
the production quota of the farm. For less production, these 40% are paid 
proportionately per unit produced. Payment is made on the 1st day of the month in 
advance, per 1/12 of the targeted production.39 
• Category B: 35% of the total direct payments, paid per produced litre, up to a maximum 
of the production quota of the producer. Payment is made on the 1st day of the month 
for the production of the penultimate month.40 
                                                     
37  As mentioned in Section 1 and footnote 5, the amount of the payments are those stipulated in the 
agreement on dairy production between the government and the Farmer´s Association. The Ministry 
then, after consulting with the association of dairy farmers and association of dairies, annually sets 
the total volume of milk that will receive direct payments during the following calendar year. 
38  The regulations were issued on December 18, 2015 only a few days before coming into effect (on 
January 1, 2016). Although the formal decision therefore comes at little notice, farmers would have 
known what to expect, with high probability, some months earlier, as it is based on 
recommendations from the Association Milk Processors (SAM) and the National Association of Cow 
Farmers (Landssamband kúabænda) and the Agreement on Dairy Production. Nevertheless, this is 
a short notice, especially if there are large changes in the total volume (which translates into large 
volume changes for each farmer, as each farmer has a share in the total), which may require an 
increased number of milking cows to produce the increased quota. 
39  The minimum production requirement of 80% in 2016 has varied in previous years, 100% in 2015, 
95% in 2014, 90% in 2004-2013, and 85% in the immideate years preceding that. 
40  Unused direct payments are then distributed further in accordance with Categories A and B, to 
eligible producers (see Regulation no. 120/2015, articles 3 and 5). Dairy farmers that have produced 
in excess of their quota can therefore receive this additional support. This unused portion of the 
support payments can amount to 2-3% of milk in excess of the quota of the eligible producers.  
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• Category C: 25% of the total payments, paid per production (not exceeding the total 
payment quota of each farm) in selected months to ensure sufficient supply the whole 
year round (June through December were the specified months). 
This division of the support payments into categories may seem to suggest that the typical 
farmer is facing different marginal and average prices throughout the year and that this could 
(and should) affect his decision on production. Looking at the 2016 support price and its 
division, Category A price is 16.24 kr. pr. litre, Category B is 14.21, and Category C is 18.27 in 
June-November and 12.18 in December (the calculations here for June-Dec. assume that 1/12 
of the total payment quota volume is weiged in to a dairy in each of those months). This then 
results in a (total) support price per litre of 30.45 in Jan.-May, 48.72 in June-Nov., and 42.63 in 
Dec. compared to the average annual support price of 40.60 per litre. However, calculating the 
marginal prices (let alone the average prices) is even more complicated than this, as these 
prices only apply conditional on a given volume of production (weighed in) in certain months 
(1/12 of the total payment quota in each of the months June-Dec.). Dairy farmers whose 
production depends very much on the number of milking cows they have invested in will find 
it difficult to vary their production to these rather complex prices. There is also an annual 
production cycle, due to calving and feed quality variations. For these reasons, production 
each year is well above average in the months of Mars-June, above average in January and 
July, on average in December, but below average in February and August, and well below 
average in September-November. This, in effect, results in production well above quota for the 
typical farmer in the above-average months and in production in the below-average months 
being close to his quota.41 There is seemingly little flexibility in the short-run to adjust 
production to changing marginal prices. Therefore, it appears that the farmers' profit 
maximizing strategy is to produce at least their direct payments quota so long as the marginal 
price for the year (direct payment 40.6 kr. plus the minimum price of 85.3 in 2016) is higher 
than their marginal cost of producing. If it isn't, the farmer would be better off selling his quota.  
Profit maximizing farmers will therefore apply the marginal rule; produce a volume 
where the marginal revenue (the price at the margin here) equals marginal cost. A farmer 
operating within the Icelandic dairy support system in 1992-2016 will look at the total unit 
price at the margin, which consists of the price that the dairy processor pays combined with 
the government support price. For the profit maximzing farmer that is the relevant marginal 
price. 42 In 2016 this price was 125.9 kr. per litre in total for all milk a farmer produced within 
                                                     
41   In fact, the farmers as a group fail every year in producing their full quota volume in some of the 
Autumn months. That is, in each of the past 6 years the farmers come up short of producing the 1/12 
of the yearly total payment quota volume in the months of Sept.-Nov. They have missed this by 
anywhere from 0.1 million litres and up to 0.9 million litres (see Ársskýrsla SAM for the years 2002-
2016, see http://sam.is/um-sam/arsskyrslur-sam/). If in-weighed milk (within quota) is less than 1/12 
of the total payment quota, this results in a higher Category C price per litre. And when in-wighed 
milk (within quota) is more than 1/12 of the total payment quota, that results in a lower Category C 
price per litre. The Category C price per litre that a particular farmer receives therefore depends not 
only on his production in a given month but also on the amount the other farmers weigh in during 
the same month. 
42  One should not be tempted to think that the farmer will attempt to maximize the average price or 
marginal price, which would occur at a production level below 100% of his quota if the minimum 
required production is below 100%. Maximum average or marginal price will not lead to maximum 
profits; producing up to the quantity where marginal revenue equals marginal costs will. 
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his quota; 40.6 in direct payments and 85.3 the minimum guaranteed price from the processor. 
But the price was only 85.3 kr. per litre for any milk in excess of the quota (and, in fact, only 
65.3 kr. after July 1, 2016).43 The typical farmer will therefore first look at the margin of 
producing his full quota and the relevant price there is the total sum of the minimum and 
direct payments price. The actual production volume in recent years (since at least 2005) 
suggests that the total sum of these prices was well above marginal cost at the full direct 
payments quota level, at least for most farmers. Moreover, it appears that the minimum 
guaranteed price has also been above the marginal cost, at least for many farmers, as can be 
seen in that the industry has produced well beyond the direct payments quota since 2005 (see 
table 2). Under such conditions, the direct payments from the government do not affect the 
farmers’ production volume: These payments are intra-marginal and therefore have a similar 
effect as lump sum transfers; no effect on the volume margin.44 
Qver the years there has been much variability in the conditions for actually receiving 
all components of the direct payments and this is an additional reason for not trying to model 
them. Moreover, since the conditions have in in general been met by the farmers as a whole, 
using the direct payment price of s=S/Q seems sufficiently accurate in practice.  
 
 
                                                     
43  Auðhumla, which is a cooperative which most milk farmers belong to, and owner of the largest milk 
processing company, announced on April 1, 2016, that the effective price for excess milk would be 
lowered by 20 kr. from July 1, 2016. The reason given was too much excess production and 
anticipation that farmers planned even more production. This was the first time since September 
2013 that the price for excess milk was lower than the minimum guaranteed price. This lowering of 
the price seemingly had the effect that production from July onwards fell by an average of 2.8 per 
month compared to the same months in 2015 (Ársskýrsla SAM 2016 see http://sam.is/pages/1-
forsiduvefgreinin-um-sam/arsskyrslur-sam/arsskyrsla-sam-2016/). 
44  This seems to apply to the typical farmer and probably almost all farmers, the possible exception 
being some small farmers (those with fewest cows) who may not be able to adjust quickly to large 
changes in regulations that are announced with short notice (the available information in the annual 
reports of SAM suggests that usually less than 1% of individual farmers' total direct payments quotas 
are left unused. See http://sam.is/um-sam/arsskyrslur-sam/). This exception regarding small farmers 
became apparent in 2015 when the production requirement for Category A payments was increased 
to 100% at the same time the total direct payments quota was increased by 12% (on top of nearly 8% 
increase the preceding year). Some number of smaller farmers had problems producing their full 
quota that year. The regulations inadvertently met this problem by lowering the share of Category 
A payments from 47.67% in 2014 to 40% in 2015. Inadvertently as this change in the share of Category 
A payments was really intended to provide more incentive to increase production in specified 
months of the year, the share for Category C payments increased from 16.88% in 2014 to 25% in 2015 
and June was added to July-Dec. 
